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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

ERNESTO ALVEREZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040059-CA

:

SUMMARY
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress because the
officers exceeded the scope justifying their initial level-two detention of Mr. Alverez
without reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Under the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, which properly includes
consideration of the factor of the officers' accusatory questions and statements, a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. However, even if
reasonable suspicion existed, the State failed to establish that officers had a "clear
indication" that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth. The State also failed to
establish that exigent circumstances existed justifying the unreasonable force used to
search Mr. Alverez.
Therefore, Mr. Alverez respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress and reverse his conviction.

POINT I. THE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION OF
MR. ALVEREZ WHEN QUESTIONING HIM REGARDING THE LACK OF
INSURANCE ON THE VEHICLE HE WAS DRIVING.
A level-two "seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable
person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave."
Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 UT App 55, f 11, 998 P.2d 274. "Important to the
determination [of whether the officers were engaged in a level-two encounter] is whether
[Mr. Alverez] remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officers' investigation,
but because he believed he [was] not free to leave." State v. Struhs , 940 P.2d 1225, 1227
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). The State argues in its response brief
that the officers only engaged Mr. Alverez in a level-one detention because "nothing in
[the officers'] conduct would have suggested to a reasonable person that [he] was not
'free "to disregard [them] and go about his business."'" State Brief 8. However, the State
fails to address the fact that the officers initially detained Mr. Alverez regarding the lack
of insurance on the vehicle he was driving. See State Brief 6-14. Yet, as the State
pointed out, "Utah law makes it a class B misdemeanor for a driver to knowingly operate
an uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302
(1998)." State Brief 15 n. 8. An affirmative statement by a police officer that you are
violating a state law is not a circumstance that "would . . . suggest[] to a reasonable
person that [he is]. .. free to disregard . . . and go about his business." State Brief 8
(internal quotations omitted). This alone indicates that Mr. Alverez was seized for
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purposes implicating the Fourth Amendment the moment the officers questioned him
regarding the vehicle's lack of insurance.
Other factors present which support a level-two seizure and that Mr. Alverez
"remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officers'] investigation,"1 but
because the officers' "conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free [to leave] or otherwise terminate the encounter" were also present.
State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^}12, 17 P.3d 1135 (quotations and citations omitted)
(Hansen I), reversed in part on other grounds, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (Hansen II).
These factors include a "stealthy approach,"2 "failure to issue a warning or citation before
engaging in additional questioning,"3 "a coercive show of authority,"4 "blocking the path
to Mr. Alverez's] vehicle,"5 and "accusatory" or "investigatory questions."6 As argued in
Appellant's Opening Brief, the officers used a "stealthy approach" in confronting Mr.
Alverez. See Appellant's Opening Brief 14-15. Both officers waited for Mr. Alverez
behind a full-sized van parked next to the vehicle he was driving. R. 88:5-6. As Mr.
Alverez "came around the van," both uniformed officers stepped out from behind the van
1

State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d at 1227.

2

Idatl228.

3

Hansen II, 2002 UT 125 at | 4 1 .

4

I4

5

Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227-28.

6

Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353 at f 14.
3

and confronted him as he approached the vehicle.7 Standing right next to the vehicle, the
officers subjected Mr. Alverez to accusatory questions and statements regarding the
vehicle's lack of insurance and the officers' hunches that the vehicle was suspected of
being involved in drug dealings. R. 88:6, 15-17. The accusatory statements made by the
officers were not the type that would communicate to a reasonable person that he was
free to disregard and "go about his . . . business." Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353 at ^f 12.
The officers never indicated how they planned on resolving the vehicle's lack of
insurance, never asked Mr. Alverez his name or for his identification or even if the
vehicle belonged to him. See Id., at f 15; see also Appellant's Opening Brief 14-17. The
State argues that Hansen, where this Court considered the officer's failure to address one
of the reasons for the initial stop in determining whether the defendant remained in a
level-two seizure, does not apply because Hansen was a case that "considered whether a
level-two detention de-escalated to a level-one consensual encounter." State Brief 9.
However, the factors used by this Court in determining whether the detention in Hansen
had de-escalated are the very same factors used to determine whether a level-one
encounter has escalated to a level-two seizure. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App
55, ^[11 (citing same factors used in Hansen to determine whether level-one encounter

7

The State correctly points out that the record reflects that it was Mr. Alverez who
"came around the van" not the officers as indicated in Appellant's Opening Brief. See
Appellant's Opening Brief 14. However, Mr. Alverez maintains that regardless of who
"came around the van," the officers' used a stealthy approach in confronting him.
4

escalated to a level-two); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (using
same factors to determine level of detention).
The State also argues that this Court's consideration of "statement[s] by police
that an investigation has focused on the individual" in determining the level of the
detention is "inconsistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court." State Brief
12. The State's argument is erroneous. Supreme Court has held that "a seizure does not
occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions[, s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and
go about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). "[T]he crucial test
is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Bostick, 501 U.S at 437
(citation omitted). This is the test Utah appellate courts also adhere to when determining
whether an officer's encounter with a defendant implicates the Fourth Amendment. Ray,
2000 UT App 55 at ^fjl 1 (M[A] level one encounter becomes a level two stop . . . 'when a
reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to
leave.'"); State v. Higgins, 837 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same); State v. Carter,
812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). Consideration of the factor of
investigatory or accusatory statements made by officers in determining whether under the
totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel free to leave is consistent
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with U.S. Supreme Court law. In fact, in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), two of
the factors the Supreme Court considered in the totality of the circumstances test to
determine that the defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes were that "the
officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, [and] told Royer that he was suspected
of transporting narcotics." Id. at at 501-02.
The State cites Bostick and I.N.S. v. Delgado. 466 U.S. 210 (1984), in support of
its assertion that "[t]he Supreme Court has long 'endorsed' the proposition that police
officers can approach individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask
them potentially incriminating questions." State Brief 12. The State's argument is
misplaced in this case. Appellant does not argue that the officers engaged in "potentially
incriminating questions" but instead that the officers engaged in accusatory questioning
and made accusatory statements which indicated to Mr. Alverez that he was suspected of
being involved in criminal activity and not free to leave. Therefore, Mr. Alverez was
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus that the defendant was on and without
reasonable suspicion "asked to inspect his ticket and identification." 501 U.S. at 431.
After finding the defendant's ticket and identification "unremarkable" the officers
returned them to him. Id "However, the two police officers persisted and explained
their presence as narcotics agents on the lookout for illegal drugs." IcL at 431-32. "In
pursuit of that aim," the officers asked the defendant if he would consent to a search of
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his bags. Ici at 432. Nowhere in the case does it indicate that the officers accused the
defendant of being involved in drug activity. The facts merely indicate that the officers
would "routinely approach individuals . . . and ask them potentially incriminating
questions." Id. at 431. However, the case does not indicate that the officers actually
accused the defendant of carrying luggage suspected of containing illegal drugs.
In Delgado, INS agents conducted factory surveys pursuant to search warrants
obtained based on a showing of probable cause that there were several illegal aliens
employed at this particular factory.8 466 U.S. at 211-12. During the surveys, "the agents
approached employees and . . . asked them from one to three questions relating to their
citizenship." Id. at 212. In the applicable reasoning to this case, the Supreme Court cited
to its decision in Rover, stating Rover "plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's
identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added); compare Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (officers violated Fourth Amendment by detaining defendant
without reasonable suspicion after he refused to identify himself). However, as indicated
supra, in Rover, the Supreme Court considered the officers' statement "that an
investigation has focused on [the defendant]"9 in the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to

8

Agents conducted one of the three surveys with the employer's consent.

9

Carter, 812 P.2d at 463.
7

leave." Rover, 460 U.S. at 502. Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that "mere
police questioning does not constitute a seizure," that questioning cannot "convey a
message that compliance with [the officers'] requests is required," which is exactly the
message conveyed by accusatory statements and questions. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35.
Moreover, similar to this Court's consideration of the manner or types of
questions asked by officers in determining the level of detention, other jurisdictions have
held that consideration of an officer's accusatory statements or questions are a relevant
factor under the totality of circumstances in determining whether a defendant was seized.
U.S. v. Little. 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995) (consideration of "[a]ccusatory,
persistent, and intrusive" questioning as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test is
proper); U.S. v. Saperstein; 723 F.2d 1221, 1226 (6 th Cir. 1983) (Definite statement by
DEA agent that he had information about defendant and his "probable activities as a drug
courier" was a factor to consider within the totality of the circumstances); U.S. v. Millan,
912 F.2d 1014, 1016 (8 th Cir. 1990) (officer showing his badge for a second time along
with his questioning and statement that he suspected defendant of carrying drugs in his
pocket turned consensual encounter into a Terry stop); State v. Jason, 2 P.3d 856, 862
(N.M. 2000) ("[QJuestions asked in an 'accusatory, persistent, and intrusive' manner can
make 'an otherwise voluntary encounter .. . coercive.'" (citation omitted)); In re J.G, 726
A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (recognizing that "[generally, courts
throughout the country have ruled that a field inquiry becomes a Terry stop upon
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'unsupported outright accusations of criminal activity.5")
Thus, when determining the level of an encounter an officer has engaged an
individual in, it is proper for this Court to use an officer's statement that an investigation
has focused on the individual or an officer's accusatory questions or statements as a
factor under the totality of the circumstances test. Consideration of this factor is
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent as well as case law from other
jurisdictions. In this case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Alverez's
encounter with the officers indicate that "a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." U.S. v. Mendenhalh 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Therefore,
Mr. Alverez was seized for purposes implicating the Fourth Amendment.
POINT II. OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
EXCEED THE SCOPE JUSTIFYING THEIR INITIAL DETENTION.
As Appellant indicated in his Opening Brief, reasonable suspicion existed
regarding the lack of insurance on the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving, allowing the
officers to engage him in a level-two detention. Appellant's Opening Brief 13-17.
However, while the officers were justified in detaining Mr. Alverez to question him
about the vehicle's lack of insurance, the expanded scope of their detention must have
been "supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." State v.
Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).
The State argues that the officers' further detention was supported by reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Alverez "was selling or buying drugs." State Brief 14-20. As argued
9

in Appellant's Opening Brief, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter
consisted of an uncorroborated "narcotics intelligence report" based on an unknown
source that the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving was "possibly" dealing drugs at a
location twenty blocks away. See Appellant's Brief 20-26. The officers never
established whether Mr. Alverez was in fact the owner of the vehicle in question. The
next factor consisted of two short stay visits to a complex that officers did not know
whether or not Mr. Alverez resided. Moreover, the officers did not have any specific
information that drugs were being sold from anywhere in the complex and did not
observe any conduct that would have indicated drugs were being sold there. IcL_ at 26-29.
The final factors were a bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde observed
inside the vehicle which the trial court gave "very little weight." Id. at 19; see also
Addendum.
"None of these factors, either singly or in aggregate, necessarily indicate
wrongdoing as opposed to innocent actions by [Mr. Alverez]." State v. Sykes , 840 P.2d
825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nor, do the totality of these factors create a
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting" that Mr. Alverez was engaged in
criminal activity. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the officers' questions regarding drugs
exceeded the permissible scope of the initial detention in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See Appellant's Opening Brief 16-29 for a complete analysis of this point.
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POINT III. THE OFFICERS VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WHEN THEY FORCIBLY CONDUCTED A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
MR. ALVEREZ WITHOUT THE NECESSARY SHOWING OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
The State argues that Mr. Alverez's "behavior following the questioning was
sufficient, in light of the other information, to establish probable cause to believe he was
concealing drugs in his mouth." State Brief 22. As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief,
neither the information the officers had before the detention nor anything in Mr. Alverez
behavior during the detention, gave the officers a "clear indication" that drugs would be
found in his mouth. See Appellant's Opening Brief 31-34; see also State v. Hodson, 866
P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I), reversed on other grounds. 907 P.2d
1155 (Utah 1995) ("cClear indication' requires that there be probable cause to believe
that evidence will be found." (citation omitted)).
In Hodson I, this Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that there was probable
cause to believe that evidence of drugs would be found in the defendant's mouth. 866
P.2d at 560. The totality of the circumstances in Hodson consisted of the following: (1) a
police informant "had agreed to arrange to purchase heroin from [the] defendant; (2) [the
police informant] gave a prearranged signal indicating the drug transaction was
complete;" and (3) one of the officers observed the defendant throw "something into his
mouth when the officers approached with their lights flashing." I J L Hence, in Hodson,
the officer had prior knowledge that an informant had agreed to purchase drugs from the
defendant, received a "prearranged signal" that the defendant had in fact sold drugs to the
11

informant and one of the officers actually saw the defendant throw "something into his
mouth" when the defendant realized that the officers were present.
In this case, the only information the officers had prior to detaining Mr. Alverez
was that the vehicle he was driving was listed on a narcotics intelligence report as
possibly dealing drugs twenty blocks away, two short stay visits to a complex where Mr.
Alverez may reside, a bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde. After Mr.
Alverez was detained, he responded to the officers' accusatory questions and statements
without any difficulty. Officer Walling did not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in
Mr. Alverez's mouth and even indicated that Mr. Alverez "talked quite well." R. 88:1617, 19. The officers did not see Mr. Alverez put anything into his mouth. Officer
Walling asked to search Mr. Alverez's mouth not because he had probable cause to
believe Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs but because it is a standard question he asks of
those he perceives to be drug dealers. In sum, when Mr. Alverez began to swallow, the
officers were acting on no more than a bare suspicion that Mr. Alverez had drugs in his
mouth. The totality of these factors did not amount to the probable cause needed to
justify a forcible search of Mr. Alverez.
Even if the officers had a clear indication that drugs would be found in Mr.
Alverez's mouth, exigent circumstances did not exist justifying their forcible search. As
argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the only evidence the State presented was the
officer's belief that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth the drugs would be
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packaged in balloons. Further, Officer Steed testified that the significance of the bottle
of water in the car was that M[i]n the past when [he] had been involved in an initiation of,
say traffic stops that contain person that [he] believed to have narcotics [he has] seen
them use that water to swallow drugs that they contained in their mouths." R. 88:29.
In Appellant's Opening Brief, State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Utah 1995)
(Hodson II), is cited for support that swallowing balloons filled with narcotics does not
give rise to exigent circumstances. The State argues that Appellant's reliance on Hodson
II is misplaced because Hodson II only held that the officers's use offeree was
unreasonable. State Brief 25. While it is true that the Supreme Court only overruled
this Court's determination of the reasonableness of the search procedure, the Court's
review of the State's "justification for the force used" is instructive. The State argued
that the justification for the use offeree was "the need to preserve evidence and protect
defendant from harm." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. The Supreme Court stated:
The justification for the force use in this case is the need to preserve
evidence and protect defendant from harm. However, we do not know,
and cannot ascertain from the record, any of the necessary fact which might
have supported a reasonable fear by the officers that swallowing the
plastic-wrapped chips would render their contents nondiscoverable or
harmful to defendant. There is considerable indication in the cases cited by
both parties that drug dealers commonly seek to secrete drugs by means of
swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they would routinely risk their
own safety or lives. Furthermore, drugs ingested in this manner can only
follow two paths: Either they will pass through the system intact because of
their packaging, or they will be absorbed into the bloodstream of the
swallower. In either event, they are susceptible to identification and
recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest settings.

13

Id
The Supreme Court's reasoning of the likelihood of drug dealers risking their own
safety and the only "two paths" drugs swallowed can take strongly supports Appellant's
argument that exigent circumstances did not exist in this case. This reasoning also
supports that the officers use of force was not justified in this case. Therefore the trial
court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress. See also Appellant's Opening
Brief 34-44.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and those more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief,
Mr. Alverez, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction.

SUBMITTED this \& day of October, 2004.

/ ^ /

V

DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

STEVEN G. SHAPIRO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 031904214 FS

Plaintiff,

ERNESTO ALVEREZ,
Defendant.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AUGUST 29, 2003
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE PAUL G. MAUGHAN

F'UO DISTRICT COURT
Third Jud.cial District'

^
•^

2 s 2004

SALT LAKE COUNTY
inputy C/eriT

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way

Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186
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FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 2 9 2004
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SS

simply just both grabbed his arm and leaned him forward and

i
i

i

told him to spit it out, that's what the testimony was, that
was reasonable.

The State submits it.

THE COURT:

;

Thank you.

I
I'm going to deny your motion, Mr. Shapiro, on the
following grounds.

!

There is a totality of the circumstances.

I don't believe that the State was in a position to require or
even to obtain a warrant.

There are no premises that are

'
t
i

identified in this matter, there are no - the vehicle was under
suspicion, but I don't know how that was other than the two
short term stays that the officer testified there are some

|

other involvement that we don't know about.

i

I give little weight - weight but very little weight
to the water bottle and to the image in the car, but I can see
under the totality of the circumstances that - and what turns
this against you, Mr. Shapiro, is at the time that Mr. Alverez j
was asked if he would open his mouth, he doesn't open his mouth
and starts to, in the officer's eyes, destroy evidence, and I
believe at that point, if for no other reason at that point
they had reasonable basis to believe a crime was being
committed in their presence.
So if the State would prepare the findings on that
and what do you want to do on this one?
MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, judge, when I sought to make my

counter-response I was 38

